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Abstract
In 2014 an excise tax to non-alcoholic sweetened beverages (SSB) was implemented in
Mexico. The objective of this paper is to study whether and to what degree these taxes
passed-through onto SSB prices in urban areas overall and by region, type of beverage and
package size. Prices were obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography
from 2011 to 2014. We applied a pre-post quasi-experimental approach using fixed effects
models. In sensitivity analysis we applied other model specifications to test the robustness
of the findings and we also present weighted estimations based on household purchases.
The dependent variables are real prices of a specific beverage category; the main indepen-
dent variables are dummies for each month of 2014, and the models adjust for time trends
and seasonality. Results suggest that the SSB tax passed along to consumers for all SSBs
and we found overshifting for the carbonated SSBs. A greater effect is seen among the
small package sizes, and we see heterogeneous effects by region. Estimating the effect of
the tax on prices is important to understand the potential effect on consumption.
Introduction
The prevalence of overweight and obesity in Mexico has reached 73% of the adult women pop-
ulation, 69% of men and more than 30% of children and adolescents [1,2]. Mexico ranks sec-
ond on obesity and first on diabetes prevalence of all countries members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development [3,4]. Although obesity and chronic diseases are
caused by multiple factors, evidence shows that consumption of sweetened sugar beverages
(SSB) is a risk factor for obesity, type two diabetes and heart disease [5–9]. In 2011, Mexico had
the largest per capita consumption of soft drinks worldwide estimated at 163 liters per capita
per year [10]. Recent evidence shows that 71% of the consumption of added sugar in Mexico
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comes from SSB and at least 66% of the population exceeds the WHO recommendation by
consuming more than 10% of their calories from added sugars [11].
In this context, the Mexican Congress implemented a tax initiative as a public policy aimed
at limiting Mexico’s obesity epidemic [12]. On January 1, 2014 the government began institut-
ing a one peso (0.008 USD) per liter excise tax on any non-alcoholic beverage (powder, concen-
trates or ready to drink) with added sugar with the exception of medical beverage products.
The tax will be adjusted for inflation when inflation exceeds 10% which in general is approxi-
mately every two year. An excise tax is defined as a fixed amount per unit of product, which in
the Mexican regulation is a one peso per liter and it has to be paid by the producer. A one peso
per liter represents approximately a 10% increase in price at the time when the tax was passed
(September 2013).
The theoretical implications of tax incidence (the effects of the tax on prices) have been
described by economists as being dependent on the structure of the market and price elastici-
ties. In markets with perfect competition, prices can increase by the complete amount of the
tax if the long-term supply curve is horizontal–a very small change in price leads to a large
change in quantity supplied, i.e., the elasticity of the supplier is close to infinity- and less than
the amount of the tax if the curve is upward sloping [13]. In markets with imperfect competi-
tion, prices are usually above their marginal costs and taxes can passed to consumer prices
more than the amount of the tax (overshifting) or less than the amount of the tax (undershift-
ing) depending on the elasticity and cost function [13–16]. Young describes two potential
mechanisms to explain overshifting in non-competitive markets [17]. If a firm faces a down-
ward supply curve for a commodity, average costs are lowered due to economies of scale or
other factors and if the price elasticity of the demand is high, the price will increase. But the
taxes can also reduce the quantity demanded increasing the average total costs leading to an
increase in prices that can be higher than the amount of the taxes. Companies in this scenario
can decide to increase prices to compensate for revenue losses [18]. If the cost and demand
functions are linear—a linear function of demand implies a non-constant elasticity that may
generates strategies of segmented markets- or weakly convex demand the tax won’t pass to the
consumers [18,19]. In monopolistic or oligopoly markets, firms can increase prices when con-
sumer’s “loyalty” is high even if the market offers similar products and lower prices [16].
Empirically, Besley’s study on the effect of taxes on prices of different commodities in the
United States (food and non-food items) confirms the economic theory that different shifting
to price patterns is possible because the structure of the market varies by product[15]. A study
on tobacco taxes show evidence that under oligolopy markets, there has been overshifting[20].
Similarly, Kernel shows overshifting in changes in prices after the taxes to alcoholic beverages
increased in Alaska in 2002 [21].
Whether this holds in the case of SSBs is unclear as only a few countries have implemented
SSB taxes, and there is little evidence on the effect on prices among these, except for two work-
ing papers conducted in France and in Denmark, and two published studies in the US and
France [18,22–24]. In France, starting in January 2012, the government implemented a tax to
sodas, fruit drinks and flavored waters of 7.16 euros per hectoliter (equivalent to about 6% of
the average soda price). Results from the study show that after six months, prices rose more
than the tax to prices for sodas and it was incomplete for fruit drinks and flavored water [22].
In Denmark, the paper reports results from three periods of tax increases on soft drinks: in
1998 the tax increase from 0.80 to 1 Danish Krone per liter (0.14 to 0.18 USD), to 1.6 in 2001
(0.28 USD) and a decrease in 2003 to 1.15 (0.20 USD). The authors found that the tax fully
passed though prices for the tax cut in 2003 and an overshifting (exceeding full shifting) for the
two periods of tax increases [18]. A paper published in the US estimated the effect of the exist-
ing sales taxes on soft drinks that on average represent 5% of price [23]. The results show
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overshifting but the effect was not significant when adding lags of the tax in the regression
models. Another study on the effect of different taxes to soft drinks implemented in France on
prices finds in a simulation that an excise tax to SSB shows overshifting [24].
In Mexico, all carbonated beverages (regular and diet beverages) account for more than 85%
of the beverages sales (excluding still plain water): authors estimations using the Monthly Sur-
veys of the Manufacturing Industry show that in 2013 sales of carbonated beverages reached
$594.4 million dollars compared to $94.3 million dollars for non-carbonated beverages (juices
and flavored water) [25]. The beverage market in the country is an oligopoly as the principal
producer of carbonated beverages account for 70% of the sales, with the second largest firm
accounting for 15% of sales [26]. Non-carbonated beverages are on average more expensive
and more price elastic compared to carbonated sugar beverages [27]. In this context of imper-
fect competition with differences in both average prices and price elasticities of demand, we
hypothesize that the prices of carbonated sugar sweetened beverages will change more than the
amount of the tax (1 peso per liter) and less than the amount of the tax for non-carbonated
sugar sweetened beverages.
The objective of this paper is to present the analysis of the effect of the Mexican SSB tax on
prices in urban areas using price data from 46 urban areas from 2011 to 2014 and to see if there
is heterogeneity by region, type of beverage and package size. Estimating the effect of the tax on
prices to see if the tax passed along to consumers is a relevant piece of information to further
estimate and understand the potential effect on consumption or purchases because the effect of
the tax on consumption may be attenuated if the tax fails to pass along to consumers. Taxes
may not pass along onto consumer prices when the producers absorbs the costs, which may
include strategies to increase prices of other products to compensate, price discrimination (dif-




Prices were obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), the
entity currently responsible for collecting price data to estimate the Consumer Price Index in
Mexico[28]. The Consumer Price Index measures average price changes of a basket of goods
and services representative of all purchases from urban households over time. INEGI uses
household expenditure information from the National Household Income Surveys to identify
all good and services purchased by urban dwellers that are then classified by INEGI into 283
types of products[29]. Prices are collected in 46 cities distributed across the country, ensuring
available information for each the 32 states of Mexico. These cities have a population above
20,000 habitants including the 10 most populated urban zones in the country [29]. In each city,
prices are obtained from a non-probabilistic sample of 16,000 points of sales (e.g. stores, ven-
dors). Food and beverage prices are collected weekly during the year from the different points-
of-sales. All prices include taxes to reflect consumer prices. Prices were deflated using the con-
sumer price index for 2010[28].
We retrieved average monthly price data from January 2011 to December 2014 for the all
ready to drink beverages. Monthly price data is the average weekly data collected by INEGI.
For each beverage item in the data set we also extracted package size information, in order to
determine if there was also heterogeneity in passing on the beverages to larger compared to
smaller package versions of similar products.
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Purchase Data
Although enumerators from INEGI are requested to collect prices data on the items more fre-
quently consumed, the data at the food and beverage level are not weighted based on consump-
tion or purchases. To present weighted and unweighted estimations, price data from INEGI
was weighted using Nielsen purchase data from January 2012 through March 2014, from The
Nielsen Company-Mexico’s Consumer Panel Services. We derive volume distributions of bev-
erages purchases by beverage category (all sweetened sugar beverages, carbonated sweetened
and non-carbonated sweetened beverages), month, year and geographic location. For 2011, we
imputed the volume distributions estimated for 2012 by month and geographic location. Vol-
ume distributions that varied over time and geographic location were used as survey weights in
the analysis.
Descriptive Analyses
We first describe real average monthly prices (base price at 2010) of taxed and untaxed bever-
ages to compare monthly trends over time (2011–2014). Under taxed beverages we disaggre-
gate by carbonated SSBs such as soft drinks, non-carbonated SSBs such as juices and flavored
waters. For the untaxed beverages we present trends in prices for sparkling water, water, juices
and flavored water and diet soft drinks.
Empirical Estimation
Since the tax was implemented nationally, it was not possible to have a true experimental
design to study the effect of the SSB tax. Therefore, we applied a pre-post quasi-experimental
approach. We used fixed effects models to control for all variables that do not change over
time. We also included variables that change with time and can explain changes in the demand
and prices of beverages such as annual projected population[30] and annual gross domestic
product[31].
We applied the model to all SSBs that are subject to the tax and we also stratified the models
by two beverage categories given the differences described in terms of their prices and price
elasticities: 1) carbonated sweetened beverages (CSB) that includes non-diet soft drinks and 2)
non-carbonated sweetened beverages (NCSB) including flavored water, juices and nectars. The
fixed effects model is laid out as follows:
Pitj ¼ dY þ byY þ bmM þ bm2M2þ bsSþ bpDoþ bgGþ ai þ uitj
The dependent variable P is the real price per liter of a specific beverage i at month t, year j,
Y is a vector of dummies for each calendar year (leaving 2013 as the reference),M is a count
variable for the entire month/year period 2011–2014,M2 is the variable month squared to test
for non-linear associations, S denotes the season that takes the value 1 during the period of
higher prices (April to September), 0 otherwise, D is total annual population projected (in mil-
lions) in the country and G is the annual gross domestic product in the previous year in mil-
lions of real pesos, α are time invariant unobservable factors associated with P and u is the
error term.
To see how the taxes passed over time, we included a model where we adjust for each
month of 2014 and compares prices with 2013.
We explored the heterogeneity of the effect of the tax on SSB prices by region and the two
beverage categories (CSB and NCSB) and we also ran the fixed effects models by package size
to see if there were differences in changes in price after the tax was implemented.
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To test the robustness of the results, we applied two other model specifications as sensitivity
analyses. First, we used an Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Estimator that includes lag of prices
as instrument variables for endogenous regressors and that addresses the potential autocorrela-
tion[32]. We also applied interrupted time-series analyses (ITSA) that have been used to esti-
mate in non-experimental designs the impact of tobacco taxes[33]. As in time series, for the
ITSA price data are collapse by month to run the estimations. All models adjust for the same
variables as in the fixed effects regression for comparison. Results from all models are pre-
sented showing unweighted and weighted estimations using Nielsen purchase data as described
above. For fixed effects, we used the command–areg- in Stata (linear regression with a large
dummy-variable set) that allows using time variant weights. All empirical analyses were run in
Stata 13[34].
Results
Table 1 shows volume distributions by beverage category estimated using Nielsen household
purchase data from January 2012 to March 2014. CSB represent about 85% of the purchases
and NCSB represent 15% of purchases. Within CSBs, on average 87% are purchases of bever-
ages with package sizes greater than 600ml; 6% for 600ml and 6.5% for the smallest package
sizes.
Fig 1 shows monthly unweighted average real prices per liter between January 2011 and
December 2014 for taxed and untaxed beverages. The graph shows a smooth and stable trend
in prices for soft drinks (taxed CSB) and an increase of about 1 peso per liter beginning in Janu-
ary 2014 that continues until the end of the year. In contrast, taxed juices and flavored waters
varied more prior to the tax and the price increase in January 2014 was smaller and varied dur-
ing the year. For the untaxed beverages, water displays a very stable trend over time with no
significant changes after 2014. Prices of diet soft drinks are on average more expensive than
regular soft drinks and their prices increased over time since 2011 but after the tax the differ-
ence became smaller. Mineral water prices slightly increase after 2014.
Table 2 shows results from the fixed effects models for all SSB to see how the tax passed
through prices over 2014 by region. Overall we see that prices increases close to one peso per
liter since January 2014 and remained over the year around that level except for November and
December that were lower. We see that there is heterogeneity on the effect of the SSB tax on
prices by region, we see overshifting in Mexico City, Central North, North Border and the
Northwest but undershifting for the rest, where it is particularly low in the South.
Table 3 shows the results of the fixed effects stratified by package size for CSB and NCSB.
For both groups, price changes were higher among the beverages with smaller package sizes.
Additionally the price increase was greater for CSBs (overshifting) but much lower than one
peso per liter (undershifting) for NCSBs.
The sensitivity analysis to various empirical specifications and comparisons between
weighted and unweighted models is presented in Table 4. The unweighted and weighted esti-
mations were slightly different in all estimations. In general, the regressions using Arellano
Bond Panel Estimations were lower compared to fixed effects and interrupted time series anal-
ysis however the overall results are similar.
Conclusions
We estimated the effect of the SSB tax on prices in urban areas using publicly available price
data applying fixed effects models unweighted and weighted according to household purchase
distributions based on Nielsen purchase data. Our estimations show that prices passed along to
consumers for all SSB as price changes in 2014 compared to 2013 were close to one peso per
Tax and Prices of Sweetened Sugar Beverages in Mexico
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liter. We see overshifting for the CSB category as changes in prices were higher than one peso
per liter. In contrast, changes in price were much lower than one peso for the NCSB. The
results were also robust to other model specification: Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel Estimation
and Interrupted Time Series Analysis. Overall, changes in SSB prices in urban areas from the
different model specifications (weighted and unweighted) are in the range of 0.95 to 1.12 pesos
per liter; price changes for CSB are between 0.96 and 1.20 and between 0.53 to 0.74 pesos per
liter for NCSB.
Our findings are in accordance with the economic theory that predicts that under an oligop-
oly market, taxes can pass through prices more or less than the amount of the tax depending
on the firm’s costs, market structure and the demand. For CSBs in Mexico, where 85% of the
sales are concentrated between two firms, overshifting was expected. In contrast, we see
Table 1. Average volume distribution by beverage category using Nielsen purchase data.








< 600ml 5.6 [4.8] 6.6 [5.6] -
600ml 4.9 [2.9] 5.9 [3.6] -
>600ml 74.5 [7.8] 87.0 [7.0] -
Total 84.0 100 -
Non carbonated sweetened
beverages
Flavored water 2.7 [1.6] - 19.3 [11.7]
Juices < 1liter 3.8 [1.6] - 26.2 [9.3]
Juices 1 liter 2.4 [1.4] - 15.8 [7.5]
Juices > 1 liter 6.5 [3.7] - 38.2 [12.7]
Total 16.0 - 100
Source: authors’ own analyses and calculations based on price data from INEGI and The Nielsen Company through its Mexico Consumer Panel Service
(CPS) for the food and beverage categories for January 2012 –December 2014. Copyright 2014, The Nielsen Company. The Nielsen Company has no
responsibility in the results reported.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144408.t001
Fig 1. Average price per liter by type of beverage (unadjusted).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144408.g001
Tax and Prices of Sweetened Sugar Beverages in Mexico
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0144408 December 14, 2015 6 / 11
Table 2. Fixed-effects estimating the change in SSB prices (pesos per liter) after the excise tax started by region.
Variable All Mexico City Central North Central South North Border Northeast Northwest South
January 0.95 ** 1.00 ** 1.32** 1.14** 0.78** 0.65** 0.82** 0.68**
February 1.00 ** 0.95** 1.24** 1.04** 1.05** 0.86** 1.17** 0.64**
March 1.05 ** 1.00 ** 1.27** 1.10** 1.08** 0.94** 1.17** 0.71**
April 0.93** 1.00** 1.23** 0.83** 1.04** 0.63** 1.09** 0.75**
May 1.02** 1.03** 1.32** 0.93** 1.19** 0.61** 1.15** 0.96**
June 1.04** 1.11** 1.42** 0.86** 1.26** 0.63** 1.36** 0.87**
July 0.98** 0.98** 1.41** 0.93** 1.05** 0.48* 1.36** 0.70**
August 0.98** 1.12** 1.40** 0.89** 1.16** 0.42+ 1.23** 0.71**
September 0.98** 1.06** 1.43** 0.88** 1.16** 0.34 1.17** 0.92**
October 1.03** 1.16 ** 1.50** 1.05** 1.14** 0.34 1.04** 0.97**
November 0.91** 1.24** 1.35** 0.83** 1.04** 0.25 1.12** 0.79**
December 0.90** 1.19 ** 1.30** 0.85** 1.06** 0.19 1.09* 0.90**
2012 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.19+ 0.14 0.15+ 0.40* -0.07
2011 -0.06 -0.19 -0.15 -0.34+ 0.21 0.21 0.11 -0.12
Month 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.00
Month squared -0.00 0.00 0.00 + -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
High-season 0.09** 0.13 0.06 0.07** 0.05 0.20** 0.04 0.08
Lagged GDPa -0.05 0.02 -0.13 -0.17 -0.04 0.16 -0.14 0.05
Population b 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.26 0.09 0.06 0.04
N 26,307 1,717 5,467 5,456 3,386 4,689 2,061 3,531
Source: authors’ own analyses and calculations based on price data from INEGI (2011–2014).
a National Annual Gross Domestic Product in millions of real pesos (2010 base), lagged = previous year,
b Annual national projected population per million of inhabitants,
** p < .01,
* p < .05,
+p<0.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144408.t002
Table 3. Fixed-effect models estimating the change in prices for carbonated sugar sweetened bever-
ages (CSB) and non-carbonated sweetened beverages (NCSB) after the excise SSB tax started strati-
fied by package size.
Package size Price change Observations
CSD
< 600ml 1.50 [0.12]** 2,785
600ml 1.23 [0.04]** 6,788
600-1liter 1.13 [0.10]* 800
>1liter 1.08 [0.04]** 7,642
NCSD
< 1liter 0.61 [0.12]** 3,770
1 liter 0.75 [0.11]** 3,696
> 1liter 0.36 [0.14]** 826
Source: authors’ own analyses and calculations based on price data from INEGI (2011–2014). All models
are adjusted for calendar year (2013 reference), month as a count, month squared, high season, national
annual gross domestic product in the previous year and annual population
** p < .01,
* p < .05;. standard error in brackets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144408.t003
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undershifting of the tax for NCSB, which has a lower market share compared to soft drinks,
and higher prices and price elasticity of the demand [27], despite also being produced by only a
few companies.
We found differences in price changes by region and package size. Increases in prices were
higher for the smallest package sizes both for CSB and NCSB, which may reflect producer’s
strategies to avoid discouraging the consumption of large package beverages that are more
penalized by the excise tax. These findings also highlight the importance of monitoring indus-
try response to the tax, as the differential pass-through by package size could result in promot-
ing purchases of larger package sizes and hence be counter-productive against the objective of
the tax.
We found an incomplete pass-through of the tax on prices in some regions, particularly in
the South with a price increase of 7% between 2013 and 2014, one of the regions with the lowest
SSB prices in the country.
For CSB, weighted coefficients were slightly lower compared to unweighted results because
according to Nielsen data the majority of purchases are from largest package sizes (>600ml)
and our stratified analysis showed that changes in prices were lower for these sizes. It is possi-
ble that the Nielsen data may underestimate the percent of smaller package sizes due to pur-
chases and consumption “on-the-go”. Nonetheless, our conclusions of an overshifting for
CSB remain.
We acknowledge that in the absence of an experimental design, our estimations rely on a
before and after approach. However, in the models, we used data from 2011 to capture previous
trends in prices, we adjusted for time variant factors that could be associated with changes in
prices and we applied different model specifications to show the robustness of the results. In
addition, descriptive analyses show that prices of untaxed beverages did not changed after the
Table 4. Different model specifications estimating the change in prices after the excise SSB tax started by beverage type (unweighted and
weighted).






Fixed effects+ n = 26,307 n = 18,089 n = 8,292
Unweighted 1.03** 1.20** 0.66**
Weighted 1.08** 1.10** 0.74**
Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel
Estimation
n = 24,548 n = 16,892 n = 7,686
Unweighted 1.00** 1.08** 0.70**
Weighted 0.93** 0.96** 0.70**
Interrupted time series analysis* n = 48 n = 48 n = 48
Unweighted 1.12** 1.15** 0.53**
Weighted 0.95** 1.14** 0.57**
Source: authors’ own analyses and calculations based on price data from INEGI 2011–2014 and volume distributions for the weighted regressions based
on data from The Nielsen Company through its Mexico Consumer Panel Service (CPS) for the food and beverage categories for January 2012 –
December 2014. Copyright 2014, The Nielsen Company. The Nielsen Company has no responsibility in the results reported.
Note: All models are adjusted for calendar year (2013 reference national annual gross domestic product in the previous year and annual population.
Weighted using Nielsen volume distribution. The number of observations varies by model specification, the Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel Estimation has
a lower sample size because it uses lags,
+ Fixed effects in Stata using areg, absorb.
* the interrupted time series analysis collapses the data into 48 months.
** significant at 1%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144408.t004
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SSB tax was implemented (except for sparkling water). This is the case of still plain water and
diet soft drinks whose prices were increasing long before the tax. We also recognize that the
study did not take into consideration promotions of SSB in stores because the INEGI data
exclude prices of commodities that have promotions. Finally, for confidentiality reasons, the
price data are not displayed by stores so we could not analyze the heterogeneity on effect of the
tax on prices by store.
Price changes for CSB represent about 11% increase in price based on the average price in
2013 of 10.1 pesos per liter and the range of price increase in 2014 compared to 2013 estimated
from the models. In contrast, given that the average price for NCSB is higher than the CSB
prices (14.7 pesos per liter in 2013), the range of increase between 2013 and 2014 represented
only a 3% increase.
Findings from this research are similar to a study in France that found overshifting in soft
drinks and incomplete pass for juices and flavored water, although in Mexico the tax passed
through prices since the first month the regulation was implemented in contrast with France
where the complete shifting was observed after six months[22]. Our results also confirm find-
ings from another study in France that shows overshifting for excise taxes to soft drinks in con-
trast to a sale tax[24].
As of our knowledge, this if the first paper that analyses the effect of the excise tax to SSB
that was implemented since January 2014 using price data collected regularly by INEGI to esti-
mate Consumer Price Index, as well as along with household purchases data. As the new regu-
lation aims at reducing SSB consumption, evidence of an overshifting is the first condition to
expect a decrease in consumption or purchases. The later would eventually depend on the
price elasticity of the demand for SSB as well as market strategies from producers to promote
the consumption of SSB despite the price increase such as promotions and other factors deter-
mining beverage consumption in the country.
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